




Compatibilism and Moral Claimancy:
An Intermediate Path to Appropriate Blame





In the free-will literature, it was once standard to accept an avoidability requirement for morally responsible agency. The most familiar statement of this requirement is the Principle of Alternative Possibilities:

PAP	Someone is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.​[1]​

As incompatibilists​[2]​ interpreted this principle, only causally undetermined actions meet the requirement. Compatibilists countered with a weaker, conditional interpretation. On this interpretation, to say that an action is avoidable is to say only that the agent would have avoided it if her preferences had been different, not (as incompatibilists believed) that her actual mental states causally underdetermined her course of action. With PAP accepted on all sides, then, the crucial question was which sort of avoidability is relevant to ordinary attributions of moral responsibility.
While this question about avoidability gave the traditional debate a sharp focus, a related question remained outside of that focus. In rejecting the need for strong, unconditional avoidability, were compatibilists working with as strong a conception of moral responsibility as incompatibilists were when incompatibilists insisted on such avoidability? In some cases, the answer was clearly “no.”​[3]​ More often, however, the answer wasn’t clear.​[4]​
At present, nearly all compatibilists (and many incompatibilists) have come to reject PAP and the avoidability requirement it embodies. However, the question about responsibility remains. How robust a conception of moral responsibility do contemporary compatibilists (now without recourse to avoidability) seek to reconcile with causal determinism? How robust a conception should they pursue?
In what follows, I distinguish three broad possibilities: a robust, an intermediate, and a non-robust conception. Roughly, on a robust conception, the claim that we are sometimes morally responsible for our actions implies that we are sometimes morally at fault for what we do in such a way that we deserve blame for it. Importantly, the desert-relation at issue here is basic in the sense that it doesn’t depend on other, more basic features of our moral thought and practice. On an intermediate conception, to attribute moral responsibility to someone is to imply that she is a fair target of blame, but not necessarily that she deserves blame (in the sense of basic desert). On a non-robust conception, attributions of responsibility are dissociated from questions of fairness; an appropriate target of blame is just an expedient target.​[5]​
	I shall argue here that the intermediate conception is probably the strongest one that contemporary compatibilists can defend. Since these compatibilists show no sign that they are prepared to exchange fair blame for expedient blame, it is also probably the weakest one they can accept. In sections 2 and 3 below, I elaborate on the three conceptions of responsibility. In section 4, I argue that an updated version of the challenge from mind control—an influential challenge to compatibilism—is effective against many contemporary compatibilist accounts. In sections 5-8, I explore untapped resources for meeting this challenge, resources available to the intermediate compatibilist. Starting with the question of when someone has a compelling claim to exemption against other members of the moral community, the intermediate compatibilist can take a fresh look at whether the absence of basic desert is always (or typically) sufficient to support such a claim. As I shall argue, there are grounds for resisting the idea that that those who don’t meet the conditions for basic desert can always complain of unfair treatment when they are blamed. This is because the moral community is within its rights to reject some cynically motivated moral demands, including some demands for exemption. Such demands can be rejected, I suggest, on the basis of what they reveal about the claimant’s attitude towards the standards and expectations of the moral community.

2. Three Conceptions of Responsibility, Two Principles, and a Challenge
We often say that someone’s behavior “calls for” (or “demands”) censure or punishment. In saying this, we seem to be invoking a desert relation that is basic in the sense that it doesn’t depend on other features of our blame-related conventions, norms, attitudes, and practices. Such other features might include the deterrent value of blaming, the “internal criteria” of the blaming attitudes,​[6]​ the role such attitudes play in personal relationships,​[7]​ how rational co-deliberators would agree to distribute blame,​[8]​ or the dignity that goes with being treated as morally responsible being.​[9]​ If an action “calls for” blame in this sense, it is pro tanto inappropriate (because unfair) that the agent be spared condemnation, where this is a primitive fact about her “ownership” of that action. A portion of blame (as we might say) is simply her due. If we believe that agents sometimes bear this relation to their actions, we accept basic desert. But we can accept basic desert without supposing that blame is ever positively called for in this way. For we might think that blame isn’t always inappropriate, and that when it isn’t, this is a primitive fact about the agent’s relationship to her action. When an ordinary agent knowingly does wrong, the idea is, she forfeits the usual protection against certain forms of unpleasant treatment, where this change in status isn’t explicable in terms of more basic moral considerations. To understand the appropriateness of blame in either of these ways is to treat desert as basic, and to adopt a robust conception of moral responsibility.
	It is not clear how many compatibilists have supposed that blame is ever positively called for. Be this as it may, the weaker desert relation is clearly sufficient for their purposes. If it isn’t unfair to blame people for what they are deterministically caused to do (but only for what they are caused to do under special circumstances, e.g., ones involving honest mistakes), compatibilism is vindicated. In what follows, I shall have this weaker desert relation in mind when speaking of basic desert and robust conceptions of moral responsibility.
It might be thought that contemporary compatibilists are committed to some robust conception. After all, the most prominent alternative has been the non-robust compatibilism of Schlick​[10]​ et al, an approach they reject. Recently, however, a middle path has begun to emerge, one that resembles robust conceptions in its premium on fairness, while resembling non-robust conceptions in marginalizing basic desert. If compatibilists can show that such an intermediate conception has application under determinism, they will have succeeded in defending our responsibility-related attitudes and practices on grounds whose moral relevance their opponents cannot dismiss.
The crucial question, of course, is how effectively these attitudes and practices can be insulated from concerns about basic desert. To this end, a compatibilist might argue that what depends on basic desert is not our practice of blaming per se, but the characteristically retributive sentiments associated with this practice.​[11]​ If (the idea is) compatibilists cast out these sentiments together with basic desert, while assimilating blaming behavior to emotionally neutral moral criticism, their opponents may find little in their view to object to. Since hardly anyone maintains that determinism’s truth precludes all forms of negative moral appraisal,​[12]​ such attenuated blame shouldn’t raise incompatibilists’ hackles.
Significantly, however, where such attenuated blame is concerned, worries about fairness become less pressing.​[13]​ This brings us to a further feature of the intermediate approach. Like robust compatibilists, my intermediate compatibilist seeks to secure fair blame without attenuating blame.​[14]​ More specifically, this compatibilist seeks to defend the fairness of blaming behavior as an expression of such characteristically retributive sentiments as resentment and moral indignation.
Now in defending these characteristically retributive sentiments, intermediate compatibilists need not endorse retributive action.​[15]​ In their view, whether such action is ultimately justified is a further question, one that isn’t settled by the status of determinism. In what follows, I shall leave questions about the legitimacy of retributive action to one side. Quite apart from such questions, incompatibilists are right to think that resentment and moral indignation raise concerns about fairness in their own right, especially when these attitudes are expressed in moral criticism and condemnation. The intermediate compatibilist’s attempt to insulate these sentiments’ fairness from questions of basic desert should raise their hackles.
Summing up, then, the intermediate compatibilist has three objectives: to reconcile determinism with fair blame, to do this by dissociating fair blame from basic desert, and to do it without attenuating blame. The most straightforward way to pursue the second objective would be to dismiss talk of basic desert as hopelessly confused, or else to deny that it genuinely informs ordinary thinking about moral responsibility. I do not believe, however, that basic desert can be so lightly dismissed. If I am right, a signal challenge for intermediate compatibilists will be to pursue the second objective while giving basic desert its due. Since there is a strong presumption that blame is unfair when it isn’t deserved, this won’t be easy. As I shall argue, however, reflecting on cynically motivated appeals for exemption lends credence to the idea that agents cannot always complain of unfair treatment when they are blamed for their conduct in the absence of basic desert.

3. Unattenuated Blame and Moral Communication
But, it might be asked, why care about preserving unattenuated blame if it is never deserved (in the sense of basic desert)?​[16]​ Without a satisfactory answer to this question, the project of showing that such blame is justified will be unmotivated.
Now someone might seek to answer this question in terms of a purpose (e.g. social regulation) for which attenuated blame (i.e. “bloodless” moral criticism) is arguably insufficient. However, the question need not be answered in this way. Instead of identifying an “external” purpose of unattenuated blame, our compatibilist might stress the “internal” point of expressing the reactive attitudes to other members of our moral community. In doing so, she would be stressing the extent to which these attitudes are manifestations of our natural human concern with the treatment we (and others) receive from our fellow humans. We do not take behavior that is rude, inconsiderate, malicious, disloyal, demeaning, and so on, personally because so taking it will further some interest of ours.​[17]​ Nor do we typically express the resentment and indignation occasioned by such treatment in order to serve some further goal. Thus Susan Wolf writes:

[W]e do not ordinarily praise and blame other persons because, as a result of engaging in practical deliberation, we have reached the conclusion that it would be in our interests to do so. Rather, we praise and blame persons as natural expressions of natural responses to what we see people do. We do not ordinarily decide whether a word of praise or a public scolding would be a useful directive to future behavior. Rather, we find ourselves reacting to the actions and characters of others, approving of some, disapproving of others. Unless there is a reason to restrain ourselves, we simply express what we feel.​[18]​

To this I would add two things. First, expressions of resentment and indignation often serve to convey a forceful sort of complaint, a sort that is not conveyed by emotionally neutral moral criticism. Second, just as we have a natural human stake in the attitudes of others, so we have such a stake in voicing such forceful complaints in response to their seriously objectionable attitudes. Both the reactive attitudes and our desire to express them, I suggest, are part of how we care about the quality of others’ wills—they are equally manifestations of our distinctively human concern with people’s attitudes.
	Consider a conscientious physician who is genuinely morally offended by a colleague’s gross neglect in the treatment of a mutual patient. Issuing an unusually sharp rebuke, the physician seeks to impress on his colleague the feelings of indignation that prompt the rebuke. His sense that the colleague “needs to get the message,” we may suppose, is informed by a general impression of the man as self-serving and conceited (though not wholly morally insensitive, or indifferent to the esteem in which his colleagues hold him). As an expression of moral indignation, the rebuke is likely to be unpleasant for the colleague. However, its aim is not to exact retribution or to influence the colleague’s future behavior. Indeed, the unpleasantness isn’t the point—not exactly. The point is to communicate the physician’s feelings of moral indignation to a member of his professional and moral community. As long as the colleague is capable of getting the message (and has exhibited the offending attitude), the point is there.​[19]​
	A full defense of this construal of blaming behavior is beyond the scope of this paper. What I wish to maintain is that we often have such a human stake in conveying these attitudes, in a more or less confrontational way, to our moral interlocutors. Just as our disposition to experience these attitudes is part of our distinctively human way of caring about the attitudes of others, so is our disposition to voice them in response to others’ objectionable attitudes. In sum, we do not need an external purpose to explain why the experience or the expression of these attitudes matters to us.
	Of course, even if we have reason to care about unattenuated blame without basic desert, it is a further question whether such blame is ever justified. At this point, two distinct (and broadly opposing) concerns arise. On the one hand, many incompatibilists will maintain that if such blame is never deserved, it is ipso facto never justified. On the other hand, some compatibilists will hold that construing unattenuated blame in this “naturalistic” way avoids metaphysically thorny issues about desert, and thus forestalls desert-based challenges to the justification of such blame.​[20]​
	Starting with the second concern, it is not at all clear that construing the point of unattenuated blame in this way eliminates worries about basic desert. What I have suggested is an answer to the question of why we should care about preserving such blame if basic desert—its widely presumed foundation—doesn’t exist. It is a further question whether such blame is ultimately appropriate under these conditions. To support an affirmative answer, some compatibilists may contend that such blame is merely a more forceful variant of the kind of moral criticism I said (in the previous section) shouldn’t raise incompatibilists’ hackles. If unattenuated blame no more implies basic desert than does attenuated blame, we can account for the special force of the former without revisiting worries about basic desert.
As I have indicated, I believe that these attitudes raise questions about fairness and desert in a way that emotionally neutral moral criticism does not. If, for example, the first physician’s rebuke had been based on preconceptions about his colleague instead of fact, the colleague would prima facie have a legitimate complaint, a complaint that would naturally be expressed in terms of undeserved treatment. Furthermore, it would be natural to express this complaint by saying that the colleague did not have the rebuke “coming to him.” A defense of the claim that basic desert is at issue here would take us far afield. What I wish to maintain is that the character of unattenuated blame plausibly raises worries about basic desert, even if (as I have argued) the point of such blame can be understood without reference to basic desert.​[21]​ 
	This brings us to the first concern. While I believe that incompatibilists are right to take worries about basic desert seriously (worries that remain on my construal of the point of unattenuated blame), I shall argue (in sections 5-8) that we can make sense of unattenuated blame without basic desert. To motivate this position, I shall now defend desert-determinism incompatibilism.

4. The Updated Challenge From Mind Control
Though largely the stuff of science fiction, mind-control scenarios have fueled an important challenge to compatibilist accounts. In standard scenarios, one agent surreptitiously “implants” an effective desire in a second agent via direct neural stimulation. We can think of the PAP incompatibilist’s attempt to exploit such scenarios as having three steps. First, he maintains that it’s deeply counterintuitive to see the manipulated agent as morally responsible for her conduct. Second, he offers a diagnosis: the manipulation subverts the agent’s responsibility by depriving her of alternative possibilities. Third, he maintains that this allegedly responsibility-subverting factor is a fully general feature of deterministic agency.
Here I want to present an updated version of this challenge. As I explain more fully elsewhere,​[22]​ this version differs from the above version in two main ways. At the first step, I provide a more compelling mind-control scenario, one that makes it harder for compatibilists to explain away the intuition that the agent isn’t morally responsible.​[23]​ At the second step, following a number of incompatibilists, I replace PAP with a principle that isn’t vulnerable to the same challenges.​[24]​ According to source incompatibilists, the crucial “control” (or “freedom-relevant”) requirement for moral responsibility isn’t the ability to do otherwise, but being the ultimate source of what one actually does.​[25]​ This requirement is embodied in the Principle of Ultimate Responsibility:

PUR	Someone is morally responsible for her action only if she is its ultimate source (or is “ultimately responsible” for it),

where being the ultimate source of an action implies (whatever else) that one’s entire causal contribution to it isn’t actually deterministically produced by other events.​[26]​
Let us now come to the first step of the update challenge. Consider the following case:

The Ego Button. Natasha is an ordinary deterministic agent, who exhibits something like the usual mesh of egoistic and altruistic tendencies, when she is presented with a remarkable opportunity. With a judicious leak to a local journalist, she can eliminate a nettlesome political rival (one who, for what it’s worth, embodies a similar mesh of egoistic and altruistic tendencies), while displacing blame onto a third pol, whom she has always mistrusted. What Natasha doesn’t realize is that a team of powerful neuroscientists has worked behind the scenes to arrange this opportunity, which it will not see slip away. While the neuroscientists would prefer that she deliberate and act on her own, the preliminary neural indicators do not look good; and so, as the fated hour approaches, they decide to press the Ego Button. It works. By ramping up activity in one region of Natasha’s brain while suppressing activity in another, the Ego Button ensures that her reasoning about the situation will be structured around the question, “Which of my options will best further my interests?” The result is that the situation’s egoistic implications become salient, while its moral implications recede to the margins of her awareness. In this mindset, there is no question that going ahead with the leak is the right move.​[27]​

Somewhat figuratively, we might say that moral considerations remain within Natasha’s field of vision but not her depth of field. If we now emphasize that such considerations would have prevailed if not for the intervention, and that far more virtuous agents would have succumbed if their Ego Buttons had been pushed,​[28]​ blaming her for the leak begins to seem arbitrary.
Notice that Natasha isn’t wholly impervious to moral reasons—such reasons would have prevailed if the egoistic reasons had been substantially weaker than they were. Furthermore, had she evinced the same egoistic mindset “on her own” (as the neuroscientists had hoped she would), we would not have hesitated to hold her morally responsible for the resulting conduct. Yet given how her action actually originates, it is hard to see it as really hers, if this means that her ownership of it exposes her to legitimate blame.
	Recall that, on a robust conception of responsibility, to say that someone is morally responsible for her conduct is to imply that she deserves to be blamed for it, where this is a primitive fact about her ownership of it. It is plausible to maintain that Natasha is not an appropriate target of blame for her conduct because she doesn’t deserve to be blamed, and that this judgment about desert doesn’t depend on other, more basic features of our moral thought and practice. According to source incompatibilists, the neuroscientists’ intervention is a vivid reminder that Natasha is not the ultimate source of her action.​[29]​ If this is indeed the correct explanation of why she does not deserve (in the sense of basic desert) to be blamed for her action, and if we are never the ultimate sources of our actions under determinism, it follows that we never deserve to be blamed under determinism. Finally, if blame is appropriate only when deserved, blame is never appropriate under determinism. Thus the second and third steps of the incompatibilist’s strategy (the “diagnosis” and “generalization” steps, respectively) fall into place: the responsibility-defeating factor turns out to be a general feature of deterministic agency.
	How might compatibilists respond? One approach would be to resist the first step (the judgment that Natasha isn’t morally responsible) by stressing the general abilities (or competencies) associated with morally responsible agency.​[30]​ In the Ego Button, the idea would be, the neuroscientists’ intervention does not impair these abilities in any way. Just as (for example) a master pianist retains her general ability to play the piano en route to a performance (when no piano is present),​[31]​ so Natasha retains general her ability to grasp and apply moral reasons, notwithstanding that the intervention deprives her of the opportunity to exercise it. By arguing that what makes it unfair (when it is unfair) to blame someone for a violation of our moral expectations is that she lacked the general ability to grasp and comply with the expectations to which she is being held, and not that she lacked the specific opportunity to comply, compatibilists might maintain that Natasha is morally responsible for her conduct. In short, they will say, her transgression remains that of a normatively competent agent—a fact from which its strange source should not be allowed to distract us.​[32]​
	In response, our incompatibilist won’t deny that it’s unfair to blame someone whose normative competencies are impaired. In his view, it’s unfair to blame such agents because they don’t meet the conditions for basic desert. And, he will continue, lacking these powers isn’t the only way someone can fail to meet these conditions. Given the neuroscientists’ intervention, Natasha clearly isn’t the ultimate source of her conduct. This plausibly explains why she isn’t morally blameworthy, even though she remains normatively when she acts.
	Some compatibilists will wish to deny that deterministic causation per se precludes basic desert, while allowing that the particular history of Natasha’s action does preclude it. According to these compatibilists, the neuroscientists’ intervention matters not because it calls attention to Natasha’s lack of ultimate sourcehood, but because it precludes the satisfaction of a compatibilist-friendly historical condition for moral responsibility.​[33]​ By means of such a condition, these “historicist” compatibilists seek a principled way to distinguish ordinary deterministic histories from ones that involve manipulation. I am skeptical about such approaches. However, I will not discuss them here.​[34]​
In the remaining sections, I explore an avenue of response for compatibilists who accept that the updated challenge succeeds in establishing incompatibilism about basic desert. These compatibilists accept that blaming Natasha would be unfair, while denying that blame is always unfair without basic desert. My proposal is that it is sometimes fair to reject some demands for exemption from blame, even when those demands are based on (correct) denials of basic desert.

5. Moral Claimancy and Cynical Appeals
To begin, consider a familiar but often neglected feature of our moral lives: the fact that moral demands sometimes strike us as cynically motivated. In such cases, although the agent appeals to an applicable moral consideration, we find ourselves reluctant to comply with the demand. Now many demands that fit this description are of no particular interest. For example, someone may demand what is rightfully hers by appealing to considerations of fairness, where we suspect that she will have it “by hook or by crook” and sees the appeal as merely an expedient means. If we accept that she is genuinely entitled to what she is demanding, we will have no reason to pursue questions about the depth and sincerity of the moral concern embodied in her appeal (none that is relevant, at any rate, to adjudicating her demand). In other cases, however, a demand may strike us as badly motivated in a more interesting way. In such cases, it may be evident that, far from exhibiting a genuine (even if shallow, skewed, or misguided) concern with what is right or fair, the agent is merely trying to exploit our concern with such considerations. As we shall see, appeals to moral principle can have this feature even when they are otherwise legitimate. I shall argue that rejecting some such appeals, including appeals for exemption, is defensible on grounds of fairness.
Before turning to demands for exemption, let us consider cynically motivated demands more generally. It seems clear that such demands occur, and that we would like to have some recourse against them when they do. Suppose that a landlord and a tenant agree, out of mutual convenience, to extend their rental arrangement on a month-to-month basis through the year’s end, now that the lease is set to expire. For his part, the landlord assures the tenant that her rent won’t increase during this period if she agrees to stay on. Soon after, the landlord adds—and the tenant accepts—a further condition, namely that the tenant must provide two months’ notice if she plans to vacate the property before the year’s end (rather than the one month required under applicable rental law). If the landlord informs the tenant several weeks into the agreement that he intends to raise the rent after all, and if the tenant responds by saying that she will move out in a month’s time, the tenant will understandably be taken aback if the landlord upbraids her for failing to keep her word. Suppose that the landlord can plausibly deny that their respective commitments (not to raise the rent, to provide an additional month’s notice) were mutually conditional. Even so, if he argues that she must honor her word, holding to this position when confronted with his double standard (“Well, two wrongs don’t make a right. You gave me your word!”), the tenant may have a hard time persuading herself that she should comply, especially if doing so would greatly compound the inconvenience of an unplanned move. What accounts for this reaction? And, would she be morally justified in rejecting the landlord’s demand that she keep her word (a demand she would normally find compelling)?
At a minimum, it seems, the landlord owes her an explanation of why he believes that he can hold her to her word while going back on his. Such an explanation is certainly conceivable. As it is, though, the landlord fails to see a pressing need for one. In these circumstances, it is easy to understand the tenant’s skepticism about his motives in appealing to the value of keeping one’s word. Far from exhibiting a sincere commitment to that value, it seems that he is merely trying to exploit her commitment. But while she is clearly right to find fault with his conduct and attitude, it is a further question whether she is justified in going back on her word, and if so, why.
What I wish to maintain is that someone in the tenant’s situation may well be justified in rejecting such a demand, and that the claimant’s attitude can be the salient justifying factor. On my proposal, the tenant’s basis for rejecting the landlord’s demand isn’t simply that he has gone back on his word without good reason, but that, in light of his doing so, his moral appeal is unconvincing. To repeat, the tenant won’t be justified in rejecting the appeal straightway; the first step will be to call attention to the apparent double standard. But if the landlord responds (in an ill-advised moment of extreme candor, say) that he doesn’t care much about keeping his word, but that he knows that she cares about keeping hers, the tenant can legitimately reject his appeal because it is cynically motivated.
Now when we consider this proposal, we are apt to be of two minds. On the one hand, we may be skeptical about whether a claimant’s attitude can really make this kind of difference. To impugn an appeal to moral principle, it is natural to think, we must challenge the principle’s legitimacy or its application to the case at hand, or else adduce weightier, countervailing reasons grounded in other applicable principles. To seek to escape an otherwise binding moral claim by seizing on deficiencies in the claimant’s attitude may smack of moral opportunism. On the other hand, it’s hard to accept that we never have any recourse against cynically motivated moral demands unless we can find fault with the principle or its application. If complying with the demand would come at a significant personal cost, and if we see no other grounds for rejecting it (i.e. grounds independent of the agent’s motives and attitudes), our inclination to reject it is at least understandable.
To show that we are sometimes justified in rejecting moral demands on such grounds—or even that such grounds are admissible in adjudicating a moral demand—would be a large undertaking, one that I shall not attempt here.​[35]​ What I hope to show is that an important part of this defense can be constructed from familiar materials. I will then seek to show how a plausible, central element of this defense helps to motivate the idea that people cannot always claim to have been treated unfairly when they encounter blame, even if the blame isn’t deserved (in the sense of basic desert).
So as to keep the discussion manageable, I shall focus on one further example. Suppose that a journalist receives credible evidence that a health clinic is performing costly, unsafe, and unnecessary surgical procedures on unsuspecting patients. The journalist realizes that she has a good chance of temporarily disrupting the clinic’s operations, and perhaps of forcing the perpetrators to close shop and lay low for a while, if she publicizes the information straightway. But she knows that stopping them for good will require a criminal conviction, and that securing a conviction will require access to the clinic’s medical records. So, with the help of a phony résumé (and the backing of her newspaper), the journalist gains employment at the clinic and surreptitiously copies records, steadily winning the trust of those around her. Shortly before her story is about to break, her cover is blown, and—in a last-ditch effort to avoid public opprobrium and criminal prosecution—one of the perpetrators makes a moral appeal. Although the clinic was undoubtedly wrong to betray its patients’ trust, it was wrong of her to cultivate and then betray the trust of her employers and coworkers. For this reason, her employers are demanding (in the gentlest sense of the word!) that she not to go forward with the ill-gotten documents.
Suppose that the journalist believes that she can achieve credible assurances from the perpetrators that they will permanently desist from their wrongful conduct, given the leverage the documents (and the attendant threat of criminal prosecution) afford her. How should she respond to their demand that she not use the documents in a way that will expose them to scandal, lawsuits, and prosecution? Quite apart from her concern with seeking compensation for the victims and punishment for the perpetrators, it seems that the journalist can reject this demand without impugning her commitment to the values of trust and non-deception. If I am right, this is because their appeal to these values is manifestly insincere. If the perpetrators were alive to the enormity of their breach, they would balk at admonishing the journalist about the importance of these values. Or so we can reasonably expect. As it is, their appeal seems to be nothing more than an attempt to exploit her compunctions about deception. Far from allaying concerns about their commitment to the value of trust, then, their demand is a fresh affront, a further indication of their failure to take this value seriously. Seeing the appeal in this light, the journalist shows good sense in rejecting it.
	But is it really plausible to think that cynical moral appeals can sometimes be rejected because they are cynical? In part, that will depend on whether there is an adequate explanation for why not all cynical demands can be rejected on this basis. For it seems clear, whatever else, that not all such demands can be rejected. Suppose, for example, that one of the perpetrators in the health-clinic scam receives a bill for phony automotive repairs from his mechanic. While we would have little sympathy for him (and might well see a kind of poetic justice in his situation), we would endorse his moral demand for compensation all the same. How, then, can we explain why his attitude is admissible in the one case but not the other, when there is no difference in his commitment to the relevant value?
On reflection, the difference between the two cases is subtle but striking. With the mechanic, although the original perpetrator’s commitment to the value of trust remains gravely deficient, his pressing this claim is not a manifestation of this deficiency. Making this demand in these circumstances is consistent with a genuine commitment to the relevant value. By contrast, when the perpetrator demands that the journalist not compound her betrayal of trust by passing on the documents, we are confronted anew with his lack of genuine moral concern. Making this demand in these circumstances is hard to reconcile with a genuine commitment to the relevant value. Indeed, we have specific reason to believe that he is trying to exploit the journalist’s commitment to this value, rather than expressing a genuine (if shallow or self-centered) moral concern of his own. At the very least, after such a grave breach of trust, someone who belatedly but sincerely rediscovered the importance of this value would expect to face some hard questions if he sought to avoid punishment by invoking it. Barring compelling evidence of such soul-searching—and some very good answers to the hard questions!—the journalist is justified in seeing the perpetrator’s appeal as a further manifestation of his disregard for this value.
	I submit that this distinction—between appeals to values to which the agent’s commitment falls short, on the one hand, and appeals that manifest the agent’s deficient commitment, on the other—is one that we can often confidently make. I shall now argue that we are sometimes justified in rejecting moral appeals on this basis.

6. The Question of Justification
Let us call the view that we are sometimes justified in rejecting insincere moral demands because they are insincere ‘the Claimancy View.’ To support this view, a defender will begin with the truism that a moral community is defined above all by the system of reciprocal benefits and burdens to which its members are subject. She will then continue:

While it is not solely in exchange for the expected benefits that we shoulder the burdens (we also care about others’ well-being for its own sake), we would not accept those burdens (though we might still act from altruistic concerns) if we didn’t expect the benefits—that is, if we didn’t believe that others were by and large prepared to accept reciprocal constraints on their conduct. Now in committing to this scheme of benefits and burdens, we understand that we will sometimes be called upon to sacrifice important interests of ours, and that in doing so, we may be protecting the interests of those who wouldn’t hesitate to disregard our interests if the shoe were on the other foot. Yes, we are prepared to accept this—but that doesn’t make us saps! If we see that a moral demand clearly evinces a lack of moral concern, and that our commitment to abide by reasonable interpersonal standards is being cynically exploited, that’s where we draw the line. Complying with such a demand simply isn’t part of what we’re signing on for! Indeed, when we reflect on the real sacrifices we may be called upon to make in the service of those standards, it seems unacceptable that we should be constrained by such demands, and only fair that those who press them come up short.

As we have seen, it is crucial for a defender of the Claimancy View to plausibly distinguish cases where the claimant’s cynicism is admissible from cases where it isn’t. To this end, the view’s defender will continue:

	We understand that there are no perfect moral agents, and that living with a coefficient of hypocrisy is (so to speak) part of the cost of doing business in a moral community. But the possibility, once we see it clearly, of moral appeals that are expressions of moral disregard, opens a troubling breach between our moral standards and our rationale for adhering to them. Fortunately, a remedy is available: we can build into our standards a permission to reject moral demands that evince a defective moral commitment. Returning to the health-scam culprits, their appeal to the values of trust and non-deception with the auto mechanic is clearly hypocritical, given their history. Be this as it may, in pressing this demand, they do not thereby impugn their commitment to this value. When they demand the journalist’s silence, on the other hand, we have a fresh indication that they do not take this value as seriously as they should.

The permission to reject demands that have this feature is plausibly supported by considerations of fairness. For it seems unfair that our good faith commitment to abide by reasonable interpersonal standards, even at considerable cost to ourselves, should be turned against us by unscrupulous operators, and only fair that their efforts fail.
	But, it might be asked, even if we can justify this permission where the claimant’s own appeal is concerned, what about appeals made on his behalf by a well-intentioned third party? Suppose, for example, that an innocent employee at the clinic, though shaken by the revelations of gross criminal wrongdoing, has deep-seated compunctions concerning trust and deception, and insists that the journalist confine herself to evidence obtained above board. By hypothesis, the employee’s appeal is not cynically motivated; it is based on genuine convictions about what is morally acceptable. Thus it cannot be rejected on the same grounds as the perpetrators’ can.
	To address this possibility, the Claimancy View must be supplemented with a further claim. In addition to maintaining that some moral demands can be rejected when they are cynically motivated, the view’s defender must deny that appeals made on an agent’s behalf are legitimate when the agent himself is not in a position to make them. Thus, when the well-meaning third party invokes standards of non-deception and trust, the fact that he appeals in good faith to applicable moral standards is insufficient to sustain his appeal. The important question is whether we would accept an appeal to these standards from the perpetrators themselves, given what it would indicate about their attitude. Since such an appeal from them would exhibit a defective attitude, the third-party demand can be rejected as well. In this way, the supplemented Claimancy View closely links the question of what we owe to someone to the question of what she is in a position to demand from us. From now on, I shall have this supplemented position in mind when referring to the Claimancy View.

7. Moral Responsibility and the Claimancy View
In Section 4, we examined an argument for incompatibilism about basic desert. Since there is a strong presumption against the fairness of blaming someone who doesn’t deserve to be blamed, this argument, if sound, goes a long way towards establishing incompatibilism about fair blame. I shall now argue that the Claimancy View can be used to resist this conclusion. To this end, I shall argue that demands for exemption are among the demands that can exhibit deficient concern for the standards of the moral community, and that we can sometimes legitimately reject them for this reason, even when the agent can deny that she meets the conditions for basic desert. In such a case, though it won’t be the agent’s fault (in a metaphysically deep way) that her demand is cynically motivated, rejecting it won’t violate any claim of hers that the moral community is bound to uphold.
To begin, when someone demands to be let off the hook for an acknowledged transgression, she is appealing to moral standards governing our responses to violations of our standards. If an agent truthfully claims, for example, that her normative competencies were temporarily impaired through no fault of her own (e.g. she could not have foreseen that a new medication would trigger a delusional episode), she is invoking standards of fair treatment that prohibit blaming those whose competencies are (blamelessly) impaired. Now there is a natural way in which demands for exemption—qua demands for certain kinds of treatment in light of breaches of our legitimate expectations—can themselves raise questions about the claimant’s commitment to those expectations. If, for example, someone is too quick to suggest that she be let off the hook (“I realize that some of you may consider my remarks yesterday to have been verbally abusive, but I need hardly remind you of how difficult the last few weeks have been for all of us. Let’s move on, shall we?”), we may take this as a sign that she doesn’t take her transgression seriously enough.​[36]​ In some such cases, we might conclude that the demand for exemption compounds the presumption of insufficient moral concern created by the original breach. The clearest (though not the only) cases of this sort will be ones in which we have reason to believe that the claimant is merely out to exploit our commitment to standards of fair treatment. On the Claimancy View, such demands are ripe for rejection. It is as though our interlocutor is making a move in moral dialogue to which the appropriate countermove is to say, “Not so fast. It so happens that the rules of the game make a provision for rejecting moves like yours—moves that exhibit disregard for the game and its rules.”
On the Claimancy View, we reject the demand because of what it reveals about the agent’s attitude towards our expectations. Oversimplifying a bit, we might say that having the right attitude towards our moral standards is part of what gives someone a legitimate claim against us in the first place. More carefully, if a demand exhibits the agent’s disregard for our standards, rejecting it need not belie our commitment to those standards. Reflecting on our rationale for accepting the burdens of membership in the moral community, we see that complying with such a demand simply isn’t part of what we have agreed to.
If it is plausible to think that demands for exemption can sometimes be rejected on these grounds, intermediate compatibilism gains an important foothold. For even if the manipulation strategy from the previous section shows that determinism precludes basic desert (and that robust compatibilism is therefore untenable), compatibilists will have room to resist the conclusion that blaming deterministic agents is ultimately unfair. Moreover, they will be able to resist this conclusion without dismissing concerns about basic desert.
So far, I have argued that if a demand for exemption can compound a presumption of disregard, even when blame isn’t deserved (in the sense of basic desert), compatibilists will have a response to the challenge from incompatibilism about basic desert. I now want to motivate the idea that demands for exemption can indeed compound presumptions of disregard, even when blame isn’t deserved.

8. Compounding a Presumption of Disregard
	Consider another case:

	The Amoralist’s Plea. Olivia, a self-identifying amoralist, finds herself in circumstances much like Natasha’s—minus the presence of the neuroscientists, that is. Like Natasha, Olivia judges that she has a good chance of getting away with an advantageous press leak by displacing blame onto another politician. At the same time (unlike Natasha), she prepares for the eventuality of being caught, judging that her best chance of escaping a harsh penalty lies in convincing her state’s philosophically scrupulous legal community that blaming her would be unfair. To this end, she dreams up a scenario exactly like The Ego Button, while marshalling arguments to the effect that determinism is probably true at the macro level; that the neuroscientists’ role in her imagined scenario underscores the absence of basic desert; and that this absence generalizes under determinism.

If caught, Olivia plans to make no bones about being an amoralist (unless downplaying the amoralism proves to be advisable). Having no principled interest of her own in a fair outcome, she finds this interest among her interlocutors merely convenient. (We need not suppose that Olivia is wholly desensitized to moral considerations; sometimes, in moments of weakness, she gives in to them.) In holding her responsible for her actions in the face of strong arguments against the fairness of doing so, it seems, her interlocutors will be compromising their own commitment to standards of fair treatment—as she is happy to point out.
If the updated challenge from mind control succeeds, Olivia no more deserves to be blamed for her conduct than Natasha does. For if determinism is true, the explanation for why Natasha doesn’t deserve to be blamed—namely, that she is not the ultimate source of her conduct—generalizes to agents like Olivia, whose action is free of manipulation.
Let us suppose, then, that in demanding exemption, Olivia is appealing to legitimate moral considerations, namely that she is not morally at fault for the information’s being leaked or for the innocent third party’s initially being blamed. Even so, given what we know about Olivia’s motivations, her demand for exemption evinces a deficient attitude towards her community’s moral expectations. This is because she merely seeks to entangle her audience in its own moral commitments, commitments she doesn’t share. Like her decision to leak the information while displacing blame, her demand for exemption is plausibly seen as a manifestation of her amoralist outlook. In short, the demand compounds the presumption of deficient moral concern created by her breach.
	If demands for exemption can compound presumptions of deficient moral concern, and if such demands can be legitimately rejected even when blame isn’t deserved, compatibilism will be vindicated. To be sure, if this strategy were confined to textbook amoralists like Olivia, its interest would be limited. However, our intermediate compatibilist will seek to make The Amoralist’s Plea the thin edge of a wedge. Beyond providing an exception to the supposed rule that blame is unfair without desert, he will say, this case helps to motivate the broader suggestion that there are attitudinal conditions on legitimate demands for exemption. If such conditions exist, we need to know how to understand them. In the clearest sort of case, our compatibilist can argue, a demand for exemption will compound a presumption of disregard by exhibiting the agent’s evident cynicism towards our moral standards. But, he will continue, there may well be other ways to compound such a presumption. Instead of asking, “When does a demand for exemption compound a presumption of disregard?” perhaps we should ask, “When doesn’t it?” The clearest cases in which such a presumption won’t be compounded will be ones where the agent hasn’t created such a presumption after all.​[37]​ If, for example, an agent is temporarily delusional when she acts (through no fault of her own), her conduct during that period won’t exhibit a deficient moral commitment on her part. At most, she will have created an apparent presumption of disregard. Even if she willfully does something that violates our legitimate interpersonal expectations—something that, if done by someone in full possession of his faculties, would exhibit a deficient moral commitment—her conduct won’t exhibit such a deficiency. Since there is no presumption of disregard, she does not compound such a presumption if she demands exemption for her conduct. In that case, we cannot legitimately reject her demand to be spared from blame.
	If the intermediate compatibilist can make the case for starting with the question of when a demand for exemption doesn’t compound a presumption of disregard, he can go on to argue that the burden of proof rests with the claimant to show that demanding exemption doesn’t compound the presumption. When a presumption has genuinely been created, so that the agent’s conduct is symptomatic of a deficiency in her commitment to regulate her behavior by reasonable interpersonal standards, demanding exemption will typically compound that presumption. In effect, our compatibilist’s aim will be to show that it is (usually) only by forgoing such a demand that we can avoid compounding such a presumption. In forgoing such a demand, we can be said to take responsibility for our conduct, in that we accept that we have no legitimate complaint against others if they blame us for it. Yet we do not thereby imply that we deserve to be blamed for it.

9. What’s Special About Mind Control? 
	I have maintained that Natasha has a legitimate claim to exemption and that Olivia does not; that the histories of their respective actions help to explain this difference; and that this difference is not attributable to a difference in basic desert. Why, then, does history matter? That is the main question that remains for my response to the updated challenge from mind control.
So far, I have suggested that Olivia’s press leak (and her subsequent attempt to pin it on someone else) creates a genuine presumption of disregard, whereas Natasha’s creates only an apparent presumption. The suggestion is that it’s much harder to see Natasha’s operative mindset as a true reflection of her commitment (or lack thereof) to our moral standards in light of the neuroscientists’ intervention. But why should this be? After all, when she leaks the information to the press, her conduct is an expression of her contemporaneous attitudes, just as Olivia’s is an expression of her contemporaneous attitudes.
To be sure, when Natasha leaks the information to the press, a morally objectionable attitude is thereby exhibited, one that is not particularly out of character for her. Yet it is hard to see this attitude as a manifestation of her insufficient commitment to our moral standards. Given that her “ego button has been pushed” (and that very few agents in her circumstances would have behaved differently if theirs had been pushed), it is hard to make the case that her conduct and attitude on this particular occasion are symptomatic of the abiding deficiencies in her moral commitment. By contrast, there is nothing to prevent us from seeing Olivia’s attitude as symptomatic of such deficiencies. After all, her conduct and attitude are straightforward manifestations of her considered refusal to govern her behavior by moral standards.
	Because Natasha’s conduct doesn’t create a genuine presumption of insufficient concern, her demand for exemption doesn’t compound such a presumption. (Along with making Natasha’s lack of ultimate sourcehood and basic desert conspicuous, our intermediate compatibilist will say, the neuroscientists’ intervention dispels any presumption of disregard.) Since Olivia’s conduct does create such a presumption, the question arises whether her demand for exemption compounds that presumption. By arguing that her demand does compound it, and that it’s not unfair to reject demands that have this feature, our compatibilist can deny that our standards of fair treatment commit us to sparing all deterministic agents from blame. That is, they can resist step (c) of the incompatibilists’ challenge—the claim that the unfair-making feature in Natasha’s case generalizes under determinism.
	But, it might be asked, what if we vary The Amoralist’s Plea so that, unbeknownst to Olivia—or better, to her counterpart, Olivia*—she too was subject to manipulation. When Olivia*’s Ego Button was pressed, let us suppose, this did not alter the quality of her mindset in any way, much less change the outcome of her deliberations. (In these respects, her situation differs from Natasha’s.) What happened was only that the Ego Button truncated her original neural processes and initiated indistinguishable ones in their place. Clearly, given her false beliefs about how her actions originated, Olivia’*s demand for exemption is every bit as cynically motivated as Olivia’s. She too is merely trying to exploit her community’s commitment to the moral standards she is invoking. If we reject Olivia’s demand for exemption in light of this cynicism, won’t we have to reject Olivia*’s as well?
	With Olivia*, it is perhaps less evident than it is with Natasha that the neuroscientists’ intervention dispels any presumption of insufficient moral concern. As noted, the Ego Button does not change the manner in which Olivia* deliberates about what to do, or the outcome of her deliberations. Be this as it may, confidence that Olivia*’s conduct manifests her deficient commitment wanes when we consider that the Ego Button, and not her own motivational structures, is causally efficacious, and that it would have been efficacious in the same way even if her motivational structures had been quite different. Although it may be tempting to reject Olivia*’s demand for exemption, then, we cannot reject it on the same grounds as we rejected Olivia’s. Whatever else, it does not compound a presumption of insufficient concern, since (arguably) no such presumption has been created. Granted, she no more deserves to be let off the hook than Olivia does; but desert is not at issue. At issue is whether demands for exemption can be rejected because they manifest the agent’s deficient moral concern in a particular way—by reinforcing the display of deficient concern created by the initial breach. And Olivia*’s demand doesn’t manifest her deficient concern in this way, since it is hard to see her conduct as not a genuine indication of how her moral commitment falls short.
	Suppose, alternatively, that another agent, Pam, who is generally morally conscientious, creates a presumption of insufficient moral concern with an unacceptably sharp retort to a coworker. Having recently read about Olivia’s ploy, Pam makes a similar appeal to her manager, to forestall a formal reprimand. Unlike Olivia, however, Pam is not out to exploit others’ commitment to fair treatment. For her part, she feels that the reprimand would be fitting. However, she is genuinely persuaded by Olivia’s argument that blame is never fair, and that it would therefore be wrong to reprimand her. As she sees it, the appropriate response to her behavior would be to point out that she has acted badly (as she readily acknowledges), and to expect a pledge from her to do better in the future. Clearly, Pam’s appeal does not compound her presumption of insufficient moral concern, even though she has created such a presumption. After all, her appeal is sincere. Assuming that she does not deserve the opprobrium of a formal reprimand, how should a defender of the Claimancy View respond to her appeal for exemption?
	I believe that a satisfactory response to this case will depend on making it plausible that it is normally only by forgoing appeals for exemption that agents can satisfactorily address (and thus avoid compounding) presumptions of insufficient concern. The point is not that Pam’s demand compounds a presumption of insufficient concern (it doesn’t). The point is, rather, that she is mistaken in believing that we are clearly antecedently committed to upholding demands like hers. In Olivia’s case, we are justified in rejecting the appeal for exemption because it compounds her presumption of insufficient concern. In Pam’s case, the appeal is sincere, and so we cannot reject it on this basis. Instead of simply rejecting her demand, I suggest, a defender of the Claimancy View will be interested to see what she has to say after we explain why we do not see it as incumbent on us to comply with it, sincere though it is. Honoring such demands is not incumbent on us, the explanation will be, because we expect agents to own up to their transgressions against the standards of the moral community (in part) by forgoing such appeals. Presumably, an agent with Pam’s motivations will be inclined to withdraw her appeal once this rationale is made clear to her. In that case, we may see no reason to proceed to blame her if she forgoes her appeal as part of sincerely acknowledging her transgression.
	Let us consider one other objection. It might be argued that we recognize the moral principle that one ought not to harm others, or to cause them distress or suffering, without good reason to do so; and that otherwise valid appeals to this principle cannot be rejected because they are badly motivated.​[38]​ If there is basic desert, the thought continues, there is reason to subject people to the unpleasantness of being blamed. If not, such unpleasantness has a point only in so far as it makes a distinctive contribution to social regulation. And (the thought concludes) the intermediate compatibilist doesn’t want to appeal to social regulation in making the case for unattenuated blame.
	Now it is not clear to me that appeals to this principle—when they are attempts to be spared from blame—cannot compound presumptions of disregard, or that they cannot be rejected on that basis. Quite apart from this, however, my intermediate compatibilist will not concede that the external aims of retribution and social regulation are the only possible reasons for caring about unattenuated blame. In section 3, I suggested that such “unattenuated” blame plays a role in moral communication that mere criticism does not. If this is right, to blame someone who has committed a serious wrong will not be to cause unpleasantness or suffering for no good reason. By itself, this communicative reason is not enough to show that such blame is justified, for such blame might still be unfair (because undeserved). As I have argued, however, there are grounds for resisting the step from “Smith doesn’t deserve to be blamed” to “It would be unfair to blame Smith,” and hence for optimism that this aspect of our moral lives withstands a powerful challenge from incompatibilists.
	
10. Concluding Remarks
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^1	  Frankfurt 1969, p. 829.
^2	  I shall use ‘incompatibilism’ here for the thesis that causal determinism’s truth is incompatible with the existence of moral responsibility. By ‘compatibilism,’ I shall understand the opposite this thesis about moral responsibility. On this usage, “classical compatibilists,” who sought to reconcile determinism with moral responsibility by reconciling determinism with avoidability, are a subset of compatibilists, as are “semi-compatibilists,” who accept that determinism precludes avoidability while rejecting the avoidability requirement.
^3	  See for example Schlick 1966. According to Schlick and other “forward-looking” compatibilists, the rationale for blaming and punishing is to discourage similar behavior, not to give agents the treatment they merit on the basis of what they have done. 
^4	  There are encouraging signs of change. To give one example, John Fischer (2006, p. 6) writes: “I think that our personhood, as we currently think of it…and our moral responsibility, conceived robustly to include a strong notion of moral desert of blame and harsh treatment, should not depend on whether causal determinism is true…” And other compatibilists have expressly dissociated the kind of blaming they take to be legitimate under determinism from retributive sentiments (Scanlon 2000, ch. 8 and 2008, ch. 4. See also Hieronymi 2004.)
^5	  It should be noted that a second dimension of contrast is not reflected in this scheme. This second dimension concerns how to understand the “special force” of blame. Two intermediate compatibilists, both of whom believe blame to be fair under determinism, might well differ here. In particular, they might disagree about (i) whether appropriate blame must be assimilated to non-reactive (in the sense of the “reactive attitudes”) modes of criticism, and (ii) whether the reactive attitudes are characteristically retributive in the sense that they typically involve some tendency to retaliate or to want to see their target punished (or to judge that punishment would be appropriate, or that the target has forfeited the usual protection against some forms of unpleasant treatment). I am sympathetic to R. Jay Wallace (1994) and James Lenman (2006) in holding that compatibilists should seek to show that the reactive attitudes are appropriate under determinism. (More about this in section 3.) For a contrasting view, see Scanlon 1998, ch. 8. In more recent work, Scanlon (2008) attempts to show how appropriate blame goes beyond “mere evaluation,” without implying that its object deserves to be harmed or subjected to unpleasant treatment. A discussion of this subtle and highly original conception of blame and blameworthiness is beyond the scope of this paper. (The contrast with his earlier view is most explicit at 2008, pp. 186-189). 
^6	  Watson 1987.
^7	  Strawson 1962. For an interesting recent approach, see Bennett 2002.
^8	  Kelly 2002.
^9	  Lenman 2000.
^10	  Schlick 1966.
^11	  See note 5.
^12	  The controversial question concerns which kinds of moral criticism are legitimate. One possible view is that only aretaic judgments (e.g. that an action was cruel or cowardly) have application under determinism, and that ‘ought’ judgments are out of place. Another (c.f. Pereboom 2001) is that determinism doesn’t preclude actions’ being morally right or wrong, but only agents’ being praise- or blameworthiness for performing them. In any case, someone who endorses such attenuated blame (i.e. blame as non-reactive moral criticism) need not reduce blaming to “mere evaluation” or “grading.” For such criticism might include attributions of serious personal failings, even if these failings and their consequences are deemed not to be the agent’s fault.
^13	  One clear indication of this is that the incentive to “pass the buck” diminishes when the objective is to identify failures to govern oneself by reasonable interpersonal standards (along with, perhaps, the personal shortcomings that underlie them), in an atmosphere in which there is no risk of castigation or opprobrium.
^14	  It might be asked why such unattenuated blame is worth preserving in the absence of basic desert. I shall come to this in the next section.
^15	  Why care about defending characteristically retributive sentiments (ones that are naturally and characteristically, though not invariably, expressed in retributive action) if we are not interested in defending the retributive actions to which they sometimes give rise? At least part of the answer is that, quite apart from the fear of retaliation, we find it naturally unpleasant to be the targets of the kinds of attitudes that are expressed in retaliatory action, especially when we find our actions difficult to defend. Expressing such unpleasant attitudes is sometimes needed to “get the message across”—that is, for someone to understand how his behavior strikes us. (More about this in section 3.) 
^16	  I am indebted to an anonymous referee for prompting me to address this question.
^17	  I say more about this in work under consideration.
^18	  Wolf 1981, pp. 103-104.
^19	  Here I am relying on Watson’s (1987) influential comparison of resentment and indignation to “incipient forms of moral address.” Part of Watson’s point is to call attention to these attitudes’ internal criteria of appropriateness. Seen as forms of moral address, these attitudes have a point when their target can grasp the substance of our complaint. As Watson goes on to make clear (pp. 127-28), this point is not to be understood in terms of producing good results. A display of resentment towards a small child might be highly effective in curbing the child’s bad behavior, but this attitude is inappropriate all the same, given the child’s lack of moral understanding. What I want to emphasize here is that such a complaint may have a point—one we care about making—even if the subject’s behavior is unlikely to change (and, for that matter, even if we can expect unjustified hostility in return). Of course, the reactive attitudes are not the only manifestations of such non-instrumental, interpersonal concern. Thus, for example, someone whose wrongful conviction for a crime was racially motivated might want the larger community to understand his ordeal once the injustice has come to light. This may be especially true if the community is reluctant to come to terms with this chapter in its history. Such caring is readily intelligible “in human terms,” without reference to some further goal, such as reform or restitution. My suggestion is that we can understand our concern with expressing resentment and indignation in broadly similar, human terms, without requiring an “external” point.
^20	  Cf. Strawson 1962 and Watson 1987. In particular, Strawson believed that understanding blaming as an expression of the reactive attitudes showed why appealing to the libertarian’s “obscure and panicky” metaphysics was unnecessary (1962, p. 80). While such a view of free choices may be required to support attributions of desert, Strawson’s idea was, it is not required to make the reactive attitudes appropriate.
^21	  One way to bring this out is by noticing that the reactive attitudes are characteristically retributive, in that they are naturally expressed in retaliatory action, and often involve some tendency to see their target as having forfeited the usual protections against some forms of unpleasant treatment. Quite apart from the appropriateness of retaliatory action, we might plausibly see the appropriateness of this stance as depending on the target’s deserving to be regarded in this way.
^22	  I address this in work in progress.
^23	  Cf. Frankfurt 1975 and Schoeman 1979.
^24	  The main challenge is due to Frankfurt (1969).
^25	  Robert Kane (1985) first presented an ultimacy requirement for moral responsibility, which he later (1996) championed as an alternative to a PAP-type requirement. Derk Pereboom (1995, 2001, 2003), Eleonore Stump (1996, 1999, 2003), David Hunt (2000), and Linda Zagzebski (2000) have also presented influential defenses of source incompatibilism.
^26	  I discuss this requirement further in Shabo 2010, pp. 365-73. Cf. Kane 1996, pp. 35.
^27	  Shabo 2010, p. 376. Cf. Pereboom 2001, pp. 112-13.
^28	  It is not implausible to suppose that what is distinctive about virtuous agents is that they are less likely to exhibit such a deliberative bent in the first place, and not necessarily that they are better able to resist it once it has taken root.
^29	  It is worth pausing to forestall a possible confusion. The source incompatibilist can consistently maintain that blame is undeserved because the agent isn’t the ultimate source of her action, and that the desert-relation at issue is still basic. This is because ultimate sourcehood is being posited as a condition for justified blame, not as an underlying justification for blame. (By contrast, the view that what makes blame appropriate, when it is appropriate, is its expedience—or, alternatively, that ideally rational co-deliberators would endorse it—makes the justification of blame dependent on some more fundamental moral consideration. While such a theorist can continue to use the language of desert, the desert relation involved won’t be basic.)
^30	  The notion of a general ability figures most prominently in Wallace’s (1994) defense of compatibilism. Wallace dubs the relevant abilities ‘the powers of reflective self-control’: the ability ‘to grasp, apply, and regulate one’s conduct by’ the reasons that support our moral expectations (1994, passim). In response to cases of artificially implanted desires, Wallace denies that the agent is exempt from blame, provided that she retains these general abilities when performing the action (pp. 196-98).
^31	  Goldman 1970, p. 199.
^32	  A second response should be considered as well. What if the compatibilist accepts that Natasha isn’t morally responsible for the leak, maintaining that her normative competencies are impaired? In this way, he might seek to block the generalization strategy at the second, “diagnosis,” step. Of course, in taking this line, they must be prepared to say that agents who came to be in a similar mindset without manipulation are off the hook as well. If I am right, we are strongly disinclined to exempt people on this basis, provided that they are able to grasp the moral considerations they are flouting. It would be a considerable revision to our commonsense judgments of responsibility if we came to believe, for example, that politicians and corporate officials should be exempted when they are so enthralled with the prospects for self-advancement that moral considerations exert only a weak pull. Given the weight Wallace (1994, chs. 4 and 6), in particular, places on our considered judgments of responsibility and exemption as a guide to our moral commitments in this area, it would be awkward for him to maintain that such judgments are mistaken here. That said, such a move might well be open to him, provided that he has a principled reason for denying that such agents meet the conditions for normative competence. (I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pressing me to address this point.)
^33	  Mele (1995, ch. 9) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998, ch. 9) have presented influential historicist approaches.
^34	  I have discussed Fischer and Ravizza’s account in Shabo 2005. See also Eshelman 2001 and Stump 2002 for insightful discussions of Fischer and Ravizza’s account. An anonymous referee notes that a compatibilist might supplement an ahistorical account like Wallace’s with a further condition, e.g., that we are blameworthy only for actions that are caused in the right way by our characters. I accept in principle that such an approach might serve to distinguish Natasha (whose conduct is “in character” but not clearly produced by her character) from a non-manipulated agent. However, much will depend on whether a compelling account of what it is for an action to be appropriately produced by one’s character can be given.
^35	  I say more about this in work in progress.
^36	  An anonymous referee has questioned whether this observation—that some responses to an individual’s own wrongdoing can indicate a failure on his part to take the offense seriously enough—presupposes that the wrongdoer is blameworthy for her action. For, the suggestion is, if we do not believe that the individual is blameworthy, it is hard to see why her demand to be exempted from blame should count as insufficient acknowledgement of the wrong. (This point is subtle and well taken.) In response, I want to suggest that there are desert-independent grounds for believing that someone hasn’t adequately acknowledged his own wrongdoing. For example, we might think that he has failed to give due consideration to why others are upset, and how she would feel in their shoes. Such thoughts do not imply that the agent should believe that he deserves to be blamed. If this is right, a demand for exemption can indicate a failure to take one’s wrong seriously enough in one of these ways, without implying that one deserves to be blamed for that wrong.
^37	  Another way to successfully dispel any presumption of insufficient concern is by pointing out that no transgression of our standards has taken place. In that case, the agent will be offering an excuse or a justification for her conduct (by showing why her conduct doesn’t have the interpersonal significance it seems to have), rather than seeking to be treated as an inappropriate candidate for blame. Cf. Strawson 1962, Watson 1987, and Wallace 1994, chs. 5 and 6.
^38	  I owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee.
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